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Abstract
In response to increased terrorist attacks on mass transit systems worldwide, emer-
gency planning and security efforts have intensified. One of the most important 
planning elements is the provision of training for first-response personnel. Yet few 
terrorism-related training programs specific to the mass transit sector are available. 
To address this unmet need, a web-based weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
simulation training program, specifically designed for transit police, was recently 
developed, implemented, and evaluated. Results indicate that this program was 
effective in improving transit police officers’ ability to recognize and respond to WMD 
simulations. 
Introduction
Terrorist attacks targeting transit infrastructure document the inherent vulnera-
bility of these systems. They also underscore the important role of emergency pre-
paredness in minimizing morbidity, mortality, and structural damage (Sahm 2006; 
Okumura, Ninomiya, and Ohta 2003; Bolling et al. 2007; Intelligence and Security 
Committee 2006). Beyond the immediate impact on the intended target, “transit 
terrorism” can instill fear and dread among the transit ridership and public at 
large (Litman 2005). This fear may translate into reduced ridership with resultant 
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economic, social, and political ramifications (Litman 2005; Dolnik 2007). While 
any multi-passenger mode of conveyance may be the target of transit terrorism, 
historically, public transportation buses have most often been attacked. Between 
1920 and 2000, 40 percent of terrorist attacks worldwide involved buses, with 
explosives most commonly used (Jenkins and Gersten 2001). Heavy rail, including 
commuter trains and subways, has also been the target of transit terrorism. High 
passenger volumes, predictable peak periods (e.g., rush-hour), easy accessibility, 
anonymity, and lack of security screening of passengers make all forms of mass 
transit potential targets of terrorism (Dolnik 2007; Waugh 2004; Fink, Taylor, and 
Loukaitou-Sideris 2005; Jenkins and Gersten 2001). 
In 1995, the first large-scale WMD attack involving mass transit took place in 
Tokyo. Shinrikyo terrorists released sarin gas on the subway system during rush 
hour, resulting in 12 deaths and thousands of injuries (Sahm 2006). Disorganized 
command and miscommunication at the scene increased the risk of exposure to 
passengers, transit workers, and first responders. Exposed first responders even 
served as a source of secondary exposure to others, including those waiting to be 
treated in hospital emergency rooms (Jenkins and Gersten 2001). Following this 
attack, major changes were implemented in Japan to enhance emergency response 
to WMD attacks. Scene demarcation, personal protective equipment, information 
sharing and coordination, and education and training are now standard features 
of Japan’s chemical disaster response plan (Okumura, Ninomiya, and Ohta 2003).
Nine years later, on March 11, 2004, the Red Nacional de Ferrocarriles Españoles 
(RENFE) rail system in Madrid was the target of transit terrorism. The attack was 
perpetrated by Al Qaeda operatives, who detonated remotely-controlled explo-
sives (Sahm 2006). Although Madrid’s emergency response plan was put into 
effect within an hour of the attack, the fatality rate was high, with close to 200 indi-
viduals killed and over 1,000 others injured (Bolling et al. 2007). Officials reported 
that the rapid and coordinated efforts of transit police, municipal agencies, and 
the national army helped to prevent even more deaths and casualties. Since the 
attacks, closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitoring of the RENFE transit system 
has greatly increased, along with improvements to its police training program 
(Taylor et al. 2005). 
Another country that has experienced large-scale transit terrorist attacks in recent 
years is Great Britain. Historically, the London underground and commuter rail 
system has been targeted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorist group. Con-
sequently, the transit system has long been the focus of intense, ongoing counter-
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terrorism activities (Jenkins and Gersten 2001). In spite of this high level of security, 
the system was breached. On July 7, 2005, suicide bombers detonated explosives on 
subway trains and a double-decker bus during the morning commute in London 
(Sahm 2006). Fifty-two individuals were killed and approximately 700 were injured. 
Following these events, a report by Great Britain’s Security and Intelligence Commit-
tee noted that while the nation’s intelligence agencies and security infrastructure, 
including law enforcement and counter-terrorism units, were not liable for the 
attack, improvements to security were absolutely necessary (Intelligence and Secu-
rity Committee 2006). In response, counter-terrorism efforts for mass transit further 
intensified. More comprehensive national and local emergency management plans 
were developed, including better training on recognition and response to possible 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) terrorism attacks 
(Home Office of the United Kingdom 2009). 
In response to transit terrorism, many other transportation systems world-
wide similarly improved their basic security measures. More extensive controls, 
improved communications, and increased presence of law enforcement on trains, 
platforms, and stations are standard in many systems. Surveillance equipment is 
increasingly common on all forms of mass transit. In addition, passenger screening 
and public awareness campaigns also have been instituted. Education of transit 
workers is also a priority for many transit systems (Sahm 2006). However, all of 
these preventive measures require substantial financial resources. Anti-terrorism 
funding is limited and in demand by many different sectors. For example, in the 
United States, improvements to transit security were made in the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, but the bulk of the terrorism preparedness and response 
funding focused primarily on aviation security (Waugh Jr. 2004; Office of the New 
York State Comptroller 2008). 
Further mass transit security improvements are planned for the U.S., but increased 
costs and competing needs have led to delays. A good case in point is the security 
funding constraints faced by the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA), which 
oversees the mass transit system connecting New York City (NYC) to Long Island 
and Connecticut. MTA security increased dramatically following the World Trade 
Center attack, which destroyed 1,400 feet of subway track along 4 subway lines 
and led to the closure of 11 stations (Jenkins and Edwards-Winslow 2003; Mam-
men 2007). Additional security measures were implemented in NYC following 
the London terrorist bombings (Office of the New York State Comptroller 2006). 
Currently, the proposed MTA capital security plan budget is enormous, with 
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projected costs in excess of $740 million for the first of two phases (Office of the 
New York State Comptroller 2008). Other security improvements, including train-
ing, continue to be expensive. Therefore, financial constraints make it even more 
important for training programs to be cost-effective. 
One low-cost training method that is increasingly popular is the web-based pro-
gram. This format is especially suitable for incorporating simulated scenarios, that 
is, simulations of real events. Because simulations require decision making on the 
part of the learner, with feedback immediately given, students are more engaged 
and learning is enhanced (Cole 1994). Classroom-based simulation training pro-
grams have been successfully used to educate first responders and healthcare 
providers on a variety of topics (Subbarao et al. 2006; Summerhill et al. 2008; Idrose 
et al. 2007), and the adaptation of simulation exercises into the web-based format 
is relatively simple. Not only are simulations well-suited for emergency prepared-
ness training, but the web-based platform is an efficient method for training large 
numbers of students.
To address the need for low-cost, effective training of transit police officers, the 
study team developed, implemented, and evaluated a state-of-art web-based 
simulation training program using a pre-post intervention study design. 
Methods
Human Subjects Protection
The study protocol was approved by the Columbia University Medical Center 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), State University of New York College of Optom-
etry IRB, and the Human Research Protection Office of the U.S. Army Medical 
Research and Materiel Command. All of the subjects provided informed consent 
prior to participation.
Curriculum Development
A Curriculum Development Team, representing experts in WMD, emergency 
preparedness, emergency medicine, and transit security, was formed. The result-
ing training curriculum reflected both local and national policies and procedures 
on WMD recognition and response. The curriculum consisted of two training 
modules: (1) an introduction to basic WMD knowledge and event detection, and 
(2) presentation of three simulation scenarios with embedded test items. Each of 
the scenarios presented potential terrorist-related events occurring in major mass 
transit transfer stations. The scenarios addressed three different types of events: 
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a sarin gas release, an anthrax release, and an explosion of a radiological dispersal 
device (i.e., “dirty bomb”). 
During the simulations, participants were presented with decision points in which 
they were requested to choose a course of action. Participants choosing correctly 
advanced through the story line. Those with incorrect responses were provided 
with the correct answer and an explanation, and directed to an online resource for 
additional information. The training program was pilot-tested on police person-
nel, and changes were made to both the training modules and assessment tools 
based on their responses and suggestions.
Module & Scenario Adaptation
The modules and scenarios were finalized in PowerPoint and then adapted for the 
project website using Adobe Photoshop® and Adobe Dreamweaver® software for 
module design, development, and deployment. The programming languages used 
were XHTML for markup, CSS for layout, and PHP for MySQL database interaction, 
dynamic content, and data validation. JavaScript™ also was used for client-side 
data validation. User tracking and reports were available as dynamically-generated 
Microsoft Excel® files. The online version of the modules also was pilot-tested for 
ease of use. (Copies of the training program in Microsoft PowerPoint® format and 
all study materials may be obtained at no cost from the corresponding author.)
Study Population
The Metropolitan Transit Authority Police Department (MTAPD) is the agency 
that polices the Metro-North Railroad, the Long Island Rail Road, and the Staten 
Island Railway. The MTAPD has jurisdiction in 14 counties and 2 states (NY and 
CT) (Metropolitan Transportation Authority 2009), which includes over 4,500 
square miles. While it is primarily responsible for the commuter railroad in these 
two states, it has jurisdiction over the counties through which the trains run. In 
2007, the MTA recorded over three billion passenger-rides, the highest of all trans-
portation systems in the U.S. (American Public Transportation Association). 
At the time of participant recruitment, the MTAPD employed approximately 550 
officers. The training program was distributed to the entire MTAPD police force 
(nine districts) in January 2008. It was accompanied by an email from a high rank-
ing officer of the MTAPD that encouraged all officers to participate. Recruitment 
was coordinated by each district administrator, and data collection continued 
until June 1, 2008. 
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Measures to Increase Response Rate
Participants who did not complete the entire training program after initially 
registering were sent weekly reminders. A similar approach was taken for the one-
month follow-up questionnaire. Those who completed all three phases of testing 
were eligible to win an iPod Nano (odds of winning were 1:100). Any request to be 
removed from the email list was promptly honored.
Assessment Measures 
To determine the effectiveness of the training program, assessment tools (i.e., 
pre-test, post-test, one-month follow-up test, and program evaluation) were 
developed and implemented. The pre-test was given before the training program 
and the post-test and evaluation immediately after, and the follow-up was given 
one month later. Key outcome variables included change in knowledge from 
the pre-test to post-test and from the pre-test to follow-up. The overall 13-item 
knowledge scale consisted of 2 subscales: WMD recognition (8 items) and WMD 
response knowledge (5 items) (see Table 1 for a description of the items). An 
internal consistency estimate of standardized responses to the overall knowledge 
scale yielded a Cronbach alpha of 0.62 (95% CI = 0.57 - 0.67). For the recognition 
subscale and response subscale, internal consistency estimates of standardized 
responses yielded Cronbach alphas of 0.55 (95% CI = 0.48 - 0.60) and 0.38 (95% 
CI = 0.29 - 0.46), respectively. The effectiveness of the training was determined by 
comparing pre-test to post-test scores and pre-test to follow-up test scores. Long-
term retention was measured by comparing pre-test to follow-up test scores. 
Table 1.  Description of WMD* Knowledge Items
Recognition 
 1. Five types of WMDs
 2. Agent used as bioterrorist weapon
 3. Key elements of a dirty bomb
 4. Key parts of an incendiary device
 5. Chemical agent that has been used as a WMD
 6. Chemical agent facts
 7. High-risk, potential target of a terrorist attack
 8. Indicator that a chemical terrorist attack occurred
Response 
 9. Use of radiation detectors that officers are issued
 10. Isolation zone designation of an area containing a highly suspicious package
 11. “Hot” zone designation after an explosion
 12. Patrol officer’s first response in the event of a terrorist attack
 13. After being exposed or possibly exposed to any terrorist agent, 
  officer’s response before returning to active duty
 *WMD = Weapon of Mass Destruction
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Data Analysis 
A total of 540 individuals participated in the baseline assessment, online training, 
and post-test. Questionnaires missing substantial amounts of data on the pre-test 
and post-test or who did not provide consent were excluded from the analysis, 
resulting in a final sample of 502 participants (greater than 90% of the total 
available sample). Roughly one-fifth of the sample (22%, n = 108) completed the 
one-month follow-up. All data were entered into a database and then reviewed 
by a data manager to ensure accuracy of data entry. Data editing was followed by 
basic descriptive analysis of the data, including the calculation of means, medians, 
percentages, proportions, and standard deviations. Level of significance was set 
at an alpha level of 0.05, two-tailed. Dependent t-tests were used to detect sig-
nificant mean differences in scores for all scales from (1) pre-test to post-test, to 
assess increase in knowledge, (2) post-test to follow-up test, to assess knowledge 
retention, and (3) pre-test to follow-up test, to assess net gain in knowledge. Prior 
to analysis, assumptions for normality and equal variances were tested. The dis-
tributions of all sample groups were consistent with populations that are normal. 
Effect size was calculated using Cohen’s (1988) d statistic (Cohen 1988). Pearson’s 
chi-squared tests were used to test the significance of relations between categori-
cal items. Odds ratios were calculated where appropriate. All analyses were con-
ducted using SPSS 16.0.1 (SPSS Inc. 2008). 
Results
Participants (N=502) completing the pre-post phases of the study represented all 
districts of the MTAPD. Most respondents were male (90%), with an average age 
of 39 years (ranging from 23 to 61 years). A majority (91%) reported at least some 
college or higher levels of education. Most (81%) participants were police officers 
assigned to patrol units, although 19% were of higher rank (e.g., sergeant, detective 
lieutenant, etc.). Average tenure with the MTA in any capacity was 9.4 years. Many 
participants (77%) had received prior WMD training and, of these, 53 percent 
reported 6 hours or more of actual prior WMD training. However, almost a quarter 
of the sample reported no prior WMD training. Over a third of the sample (37%) 
had actual prior large-scale disaster or WMD response experience. See Table 2 for 
a summary of demographic information.
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Table 2. Description of the Sample, MTAPD (N = 502)
  n 
Characteristics (% reporting)*
Gender 
 Male 453 (90.2)
 Female 49 (9.8)
Age   X = 38.5 yrs
  SD± = 7.9 yrs
Highest Educational Degree 
 High school diploma or GED 44 (8.8)
 Some college or bachelor’s degree 402 (80.1)
 Some graduate school or graduate degree 56 (11.2)
Rank 
 Police Officer 401 (80.5)
 Sergeant 60 (12.0)
 Detective Sergeant 7 (1.4)
 Detective Lieutenant 18 (3.6)
 Captain 6 (1.2)
 Deputy Inspector 2 (0.4)
 Chief 4 (0.8)
Length of Time Affiliated with Current Organization X = 9.4 yrs
  SD± = 6.8 yrs
Length of Time at Current Rank X = 7.2 yrs
  SD± = 5.6 yrs
Assignment 
 Administrative 6 (1.2)
 Investigative 38 (7.6)
 Patrol 425 (84.7)
 Specialty Unit (e.g., Emergency Services Unit) 25 (5.0)
 Command 8 (1.6)
Prior WMD Training 
 None 118 (23.5)
 1-5 hrs 180 (35.9)
 6-10 hrs 90 (17.9)
 More than 10 hrs 114 (22.7)
Prior First-Responder Training 
 Yes 445 (88.6)
 No 57 (11.4)
Prior Response to Large-Scale Disaster or WMD Event 
 Yes 184 (36.7)
 No 318 (63.3)
*Column numbers may not add to 502 due to missing values. 
x = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.
‒
‒
‒
‒
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On average, participants had high scores (12.0 points out of a maximum of 13.0 
points, or a score of 92%) on the overall knowledge set of questions on the pre-test. 
This indicates a high baseline level of general WMD knowledge. Scores also were 
high on the pre-test for the subset of items related to recognition of WMD events 
(7.3/8.0, 91%) and response to WMD scenarios (4.7/5.0, 94%). 
Overall Knowledge Assessment
Results of the dependent t-test indicated that there was a statistically significant 
mean difference between overall scores on the pretest and post-test, t(501) = 9.3, 
p < 0.001, d = 0.41 (95% CI = 0.33 – 0.50). Assessment scores significantly increased 
immediately following training from pre-test (Mean [M] = 12.0, Standard Devia-
tion [SD] = 1.4) to post-test (M = 12.6, SD = 0.9); thus, the training was effective 
at increasing knowledge. Furthermore, for individuals who completed all three 
waves of testing, knowledge was retained from the post-test (M = 12.7, SD = 0.6) 
to follow-up (M = 12.6, SD = 0.9), as there was no statistically significant differ-
ence between assessment scores, t(107) = -1.14, p = 0.26. In terms of net gain in 
overall knowledge, there was a significant difference between assessment scores 
at pre-test and follow-up, t(107) = 3.0, p < 0.01, d = 0.45 (95% CI = 0.26 - 0.64), 
with assessment scores significantly increasing from pretest (M = 12.3, SD = 1.1) 
to follow-up test (M = 12.6, SD = 0.9). 
WMD Recognition 
For the eight-item WMD recognition scale there was also an increase in knowledge 
after training, t(501) = 7.7, p < .001, d = 0.35 (95% CI = 0.26 - 0.43). Specifically, 
WMD recognition subscale scores significantly increased from pre-test (M = 7.3, 
SD = 1.1) to post-test (M = 7.7, SD = 0.7); thus, the training was effective at increas-
ing WMD recognition knowledge. Knowledge of recognition of WMDs was also 
retained at follow-up; there was no statistically significant difference in recogni-
tion subscale scores at post-test (M = 7.7, SD = 0.6) and follow-up test (M = 7.7, SD 
= 0.7), t(107) = -0.37, p = 0.72. Furthermore, scores on the recognition subscale did 
significantly increase from pre-test (M = 7.4, SD = 1.0) to follow-up test (M = 7.7, 
SD = 0.7), t(107) = 2.65, p < 0.01, d = 0.35 (95% CI = 0.16 - 0.54); thus, there was an 
overall net gain in WMD recognition knowledge for participants who completed 
the one-month follow-up. 
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WMD Response 
Results from the dependent t-test revealed a significant difference between WMD 
response subscale scores from pre-test (M = 4.7, SD = 0.6) to post-test (M = 4.9, 
SD = 0.3), t(501) = 7.8, p < 0.001, d = 0.35 (95% CI = 0.26 – 0.44); the training was 
effective at increasing WMD response-specific knowledge. In addition, knowledge 
of WMD response was retained from the post-test (M = 5.0, SD = 0.1) to one-
month follow-up test (M = 4.9, SD = 0.4), as there were no significant differences 
between subscale scores, t(107) = -1.9, p = 0.06. Scores on the recognition subscale 
were not significantly different from pre-test (M = 4.8, SD = 0.4) to follow-up test 
(M = 4.9, SD = 0.4), t(107) = 1.73, p = 0.09, indicating that there was no significant 
gain in WMD recognition knowledge from baseline to follow-up.
Participants whose length of time at their current position in the MTAPD was 
below the mean (7.2 years) were almost two times more likely to increase their 
knowledge of proper response to WMD scenarios from pre-test to post-test 
immediately following training in comparison with participants whose time at 
their current position was above the mean, X2(1) = 5.4, p < 0.05, OR = 1.9 (95% CI 
= 1.1 – 3.3).
Scenario Simulations
Regarding the 11 decision points in the simulation scenarios, on average, more 
than 90 percent of the participants made the correct decision points.
Follow-up Test 
Follow-up tests were completed by 108 participants (22%), and some differences 
were noted between participants who did not participate at follow-up and those 
who did. Police officers were two times less likely to complete one-month follow-
up tests than MTAPD participants from all other ranks, X2(1) = 8.2, p < 0.01, OR = 
2.0 (95% CI = 1.2 – 3.4). Participants with less than six hours of prior WMD training 
were almost two times less likely to complete the follow-up than participants with 
more prior training, X2(1) = 7.2, p < 0.01, OR = 1.8 (95% CI = 1.2 – 2.8). Further-
more, MTA police officers who never responded to a large scale disaster or WMD 
event were two times less likely to complete the follow-up than those who had 
prior disaster response, X2(1) = 10.6, p = 0.001, OR = 2.0 (95% CI = 1.3 – 3.1). Last, 
there was a difference in pre-test scores for police who followed-up and those who 
did not; police who did not follow-up tended to score lower on the pre-test (M = 
12.0, SD = 1.4) than those who did follow-up (M = 12.3, SD = 1.1), t(216.5) = 2.0, 
p < 0.05, d = 0.22 (95% CI = 0.007 - 0.43). No significant differences were found 
between police who completed the follow-up test and those who did not on age, 
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gender, education, tenure with the MTAPD, length of time at their current posi-
tion, current assignment, and prior first-responder training variables.
Evaluation 
Participants (N=502) provided very positive feedback on the program evaluation. 
A large majority (92%) of police indicated that the training program reinforced 
their understanding of WMDs. Eighty-eight percent reported that the use of 
scenarios in the simulation exercises was especially helpful in improving their 
understanding of WMDs. Most of the sample (94%) indicated that the training 
described realistic scenarios and events. Eighty-one percent of MTA police also 
indicated that they felt more confident in their ability to respond to a WMD event 
following this training. 
Discussion
This web-based WMD preparedness training for transit police was effective in 
increasing knowledge. Increased knowledge scores (from pre-test to post-test) 
were noted for the overall assessment, WMD recognition items, and WMD 
response items. Furthermore, for participants who completed all three waves of 
testing, knowledge was retained for overall and domain-specific knowledge at 
the one-month follow-up. There was a net gain in knowledge (from pre-test to 
follow-up test) on the overall WMD assessment and WMD recognition items. 
Because the baseline level of knowledge was very high, the improvement was 
small, yet statistically significant. The estimates of internal consistency for the 
13-item assessment and WMD recognition and WMD response subscales were 
tolerable, given the high scores on almost all baseline items (and thus limited vari-
ability). Consequently, a high alpha value was not expected, yet the results were 
still significant. In addition, this training program received a positive evaluation. 
Most participants felt the scenarios were realistic illustrations of WMD events and 
also helpful in reinforcing their knowledge and building their confidence. Future 
training should include more difficult test items at the pre-test level, as this will 
allow for more robust measures of improvement.
Although the training was generally effective for all demographic groups, it was 
especially so for participants with fewer years of tenure on the job. Therefore, the 
training program might be most appropriate for new recruits, and a more difficult, 
advanced program might be better suited for more seasoned officers. To improve 
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follow-up testing response rates, better incentives might be used. If training and 
follow-up testing are mandatory, poor response rates may be eliminated. 
Limitations 
The study was conducted with transit police affiliated with the MTA in New York 
City, and these officers may have had more disaster response experience than 
transit police in other cities. Therefore, this program and its effectiveness may not 
be generalizable across all transit agencies in the United States. However, the basic 
WMD knowledge module and scenarios should be applicable across a wide range 
of agencies and cities, and further study of other urban police forces would be 
useful in documenting this. 
Conclusions
The threat of transit terrorist attacks involving WMD and the potential vulner-
ability of transit systems worldwide make security and emergency response 
preparedness important. Training of transit police and first responders can help 
increase the safety and security of passengers and transit workers. The approach 
we describe here is an effective and low-cost method for training an urban transit 
police force on the general recognition and appropriate response to WMD events. 
This web-based training program, with embedded performance measures, could 
be adapted easily to fit the needs of other first responders, such as transit workers. 
It is also easily modifiable to meet the needs of individual transit police depart-
ments. Online training should also be supplemented with hands-on practice and 
refresher trainings to increase retention of knowledge.
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